The Turing Machine is the paradigmatic case of computing machines, but there are others, such as Artificial Neural Networks, Table Computing , RelationalIndeterminate computing and diverse forms of analogical computing, each of which based on a particular underlying intuition of the phenomenon of computing. This variety can be captured in terms of system levels, re-interpreting and generalizing Newell's hierarchy, which includes the knowledge level at the top and the symbol level immediately below it. In this re-interpretation the knowledge level consists of human knowledge and the symbol level is generalized into a new level that here is called The Mode of Computing. Each computing paradigm uses a particular mode, and a central question for Cognition is what is the mode of natural computing. The mode of computing provides a novel perspective on the phenomena of computing, the representational and non-representational views of cognition, and consciousness.
speculative or introspective methods, that were not scientific, and also in opposition to behaviorism, that did not regard representations as genuine objects of study. Chomsky made the proposal explicit with the introduction of syntactic structures [6] and his refutation of Skinner's Verbal Behavior [7] . More generally, the representational view of cognition was extensively argued by Fodor who proposed that the object of cognition was a mental language, the Language of Thought (LOT) or Mentalese, with a syntactic or compositional structure and a propositional and representational character [9] , that was inspired in the TM directly.
A representation is understood in AI as a symbolic structure that is manipulated by the TM. This use was made explicit in the so-called Knowledge Representation Hypothesis which states that the knowledge exhibited by a computational process can be considered representational if its structural ingredients can be rendered as propositions with a linguistic character, that are also causal and essential of the behavior exhibited by the computational agent [27] . This hypothesis underlies the AI distinction between representational or symbolic versus non-representational or sub-symbolic systems. In the former, knowledge is expressed through declarative languages (e.g., logical or functional) and can be reasoned about whereas in the latter knowledge is meant to be used directly (e.g., when skills are deployed) and it is expressed through opaque structures such as neural networks or through specific algorithms and other structures that cannot be rendered as sets of propositions.
However, there is another sense of representation that refers to the mental object resulting from interpreting words and sentences or other kinds of information presented to the mind through perception. Representing in this latter sense is to ascribe meaning to the objects of interpretation, allowing the agent to be aware, understand and be conscious. This sense of "meaning" includes lexical and compositional semantics as well as the interpretation of representations in relation to a context of use, considering indexicals, intentions, beliefs, and desires. It also includes the contribution to the interpretation of knowledge about the domain, common sense knowledge and, more generally, the whole of the conceptual and emotional perspective of the interpreter towards the representational object and, through such an object, to the world. People make such semantic attribution but the Knowledge Representation Hypothesis is not committed to whether or not computational agents make it too.
The distinction of these two senses of representation can be seen in terms of system levels. Complex phenomena or devices can be studied at different levels of abstraction or granularity, such that each level has its own theoretical terms and lows of behavior, and the phenomena at each level can be studied independently of other levels. For the case of digital computers Newell distinguished, from bottom to top, the physical phenomena, the device, the electronic circuits, the logic circuits, the register transfer or computer architecture levels, with the symbol and the knowledge levels at the top of the hierarchy [19] . A simplified version of Newell's levels collecting the hardware levels together is illustrated in Figure 1 .
The Turing Machine proper is defined at the symbol level, where symbolic Newell's main system levels manipulation takes place, and reduce to all the levels below, down to the physical phenomena. Meaning, on its part, belongs to the knowledge level. Newell stated that the knowledge level emerges from but is not reducible to the symbol level. He also sustained that the medium of this level is knowledge itself and its only rule of behavior is what he called the Principle of Rationality. He -in conjunction with Simon-also postulated the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis sustaining that a system of grounded symbols provides the necessary and sufficient condition to generate general intelligence [18] . This latter hypothesis refers also to the symbolic manipulation performed at the symbol level. From Newell and Simon's claims it can be elicited that the knowledge level holds the representations that result from interpreting the structures at the symbol level, thus digital computers can understand and be conscious. However, it is not necessary to subscribe to such claims by simply holding that the knowledge level contains the interpretations ascribed to symbolic structures by people. Hence, in the present re-interpretation of Newell's hierarchy all levels from the symbol one down to the physical phenomena are implemented in machines, but the knowledge level is human knowledge.
The sense of representation at the knowledge level corresponds to the one contested by Searle in the story of the Chinese Room, in which an English speaking person, who does not understand Chinese, answers nevertheless questions in Chinese by following instructions and data, without been aware of the meaning of the questions and their answers [23] . In terms of the hierarchy of systems levels, all operations of such individual are performed at the symbol level, thus such machine represents in the symbolic sense but is not aware or conscious because it does not do so at the knowledge level. Searle dubbed this latter view weak AI in opposition to the view that computers can represent at the knowledge level, that Searle refers to as strong AI.
On a more basic level, the distinction between the two senses of representation is already present in the definition of the Turing Machine. The machine maps strings of symbols on the tape in the initial state of the computation to strings in the final state without being aware what such strings mean. This is a purely mechanical process but the strings are interpreted by people in relation to a well-defined set of interpretation conditions, as stressed by Boolos and Jeffrey [3] . The TM manipulates units of form (i.e., the symbols on the tape) but human interpreters understand the units of content or concepts represented by such units of form. A computation involves these two aspects always: the device or natural phenomenon that maps inputs into outputs and the agent that makes the interpretation or the semantic attribution. To say this in a nutshell, there is no computation without interpretation.
The Turing Machine is a theoretical device that models all digital computers -which are the product of the inventive activity of people-and constitutes a universal model of artificial or engineered computing. In this mode of computing the machine and the interpreter are different entities in opposition to natural computing in which the machine that performs the mechanical or physical process and the interpreter that assigns meanings and understands is the same individual.
The capability of manipulating symbols in natural computing and the ability to represent or being conscious are two aspects of the same phenomenon, and as Turing Machines do not have this latter capability themselves, such model of computing cannot fully capture the phenomena of natural computing. Hence, there needs to be forms of computing that are more powerful than the one rendered by the Turing Machine, at least in this aspect.
The attribution of meaning to computing systems should also be seen in relation to whether subjects of study are actual mechanisms, such as robots, or whether computers are used for developing and testing cognitive models. In the former, and considering that TMs do not ascribe meaning, such devices are similar to standard machinery -i.e., radios,TVs, etc.-which are unaware of the meanings of the signals they manipulate for human consumption. In the latter, computers are unaware of the meaning of the representations that they are supposed to model too, but the theorists who devise such models interpret and attribute meanings to such processes. So, once again, computer systems implement cognitive models at the symbol level but interpretation and representation belong to the knowledge level which resides in the mind of human experimenters.
Connectionism and alternative notions of Computing
The Turing Machine articulates Turing's particular intuition of the phenomenon of computing. Turing's model reflects clearly the behavior of a human computer making calculations on a piece of graph paper with the purpose of mapping arguments into values of mathematical functions. In his model symbols are written and erased in individual cells with a pencil and rubber, that can be seen as local scanning devices, and the finite state control with the transition table are held in the human mind. Turing's underlying intuition is often identified, implicitly or explicitly, with the phenomena of computing itself. This owes itself to historical reasons for before the TM there were very few and not fully articulated notions of computing. However, the phenomena of the mind is much richer and varied than manipulating symbol either for making arithmetic calculations or linguistic inferences, and there may be alternative underlying intuitions of what is computing, specially natural computing.
An effort in such direction was the Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) program or Connectionism, that holds that intelligence emerges from the interactions of large numbers of simple processing units, and that symbolic systems or TMs have failed to model appropriately most mind processes, like perception, memory, language and thought (see the Preface of [22] ). According to this program, distributed processes are opposed to Turing Machines in the relation between units of memory -and the units of form stored in them, i.e., symbols of the TM's alphabet-with the units of content or the concepts that such structures represent: in TMs this relation is one-to-one, while in distributed systems is many-to-many [11] . Thus, while in the TM basic concepts are represented in local memory regions that are independent of the memory regions allocated to other basic concepts, the memory units used in distributed concepts may overlap in arbitrary ways; for instance, a particular neuron can contribute to the representation of more than one concept, and a concept may share neurons with other concepts. In addition, distributed representations can generalize and the extension of the represented concept may contain individuals that were not considered when the representation was originally formed if they are similar enough to other individuals in such extension. This effect cannot be expected in local representations. These intuitions have been very productive as can be seen in the impact of current deep artificial neural-networks (ANNs).
Whether connectionist systems and ANNs are essentially different models of computing has been subject of intense debate. Fodor and Pylyshyn pointed out their limitations to express syntactic structure and their capability to hold information as standard memories [10] . In this sense ANNs implement transfer functions that are useful for classification and prediction, for instance, but it is not possible to represent the syntactic structure of a natural or formal language. Neither is it possible to store information in ANNs that would be otherwise represented in memory, such as a data-base of a bank's clientele.
However, both the Mentalese and connectionist systems are meant as representational in opposition to eliminativism which denies representations altogether, as stressed by Fodor and Pylyshyn [10] . The difference is that in symbolic representations meanings are ascribed to strings and sequences of strings by composition, while in connectionist systems interpretations emerge from the collective operation of the units in the network. Fodor and Pylyshyn granted that connectionist systems could implement the Mentalese -the object of cognition proper-that emerges from the workings of the natural neural networks or the brain. This relation has been explained in terms of system levels, but using Marr's Functional, Algorithmic and Implementation levels [17] .
Hence, LOT stands at the functional level and the ANNs at the algorithmic one, and a great deal of effort has been made to reduce the language of thought to network implementations although with very limited success (e.g., [4, 13, 14] ). Advocates of the connectionist side have also argued that these systems are representations in their on right and should be thought of at the functional level [21] , but this debate seems to stand in a dead-end to the present date. The relation between the Mentalese and connectionist systems admitted by Fodor and Pylyshyn in terms of Marr's hierarchy of system levels is illustrated in However, connectionism and ANNs deviated from the original program in practice because ANNs are specified as Turing-computable functions, implemented with standard data-structures and algorithms, and run in standard digital computers, thus ANNs are TMs.
2 Furthermore, if the claim is that TM representations are local but practical implementations of ANN use local memory then the distributed property is only simulated but not actual.
This distinction can also be seen in terms of system levels (using the proposed reinterpretation of Newell levels): the interpretation of the ANNs and connectionist systems is expressed at the knowledge level, where human interpreters see ANNs as distributed representations, but their implementation as standard programs is carried on at the symbol level where all representations are local. For these reasons ANNs can be best thought of as virtual machines that use the TM as the actual computing engine.
Cognition without Representation
The observation that representations at the knowledge level are absent in machines and cannot be inspected or analyzed in animals or people directly, as in behaviorism, led to the proposal that mental objects can be dispensed with altogether. This view was made explicit in AI by Brooks [2] in conjunction with the introduction of the so-called embedded architectures for modeling bio-inspired robotic mechanisms. This program was carried through specific algorithms and ANNs but now under the assumption that such models were not representational. Brook's proposal introduced a new view on the representational and symbolic status of AI formalisms, in addition to strong AI, weak AI and sub-symbolic systems, as illustrated in Figure 3 . The latter view presupposes either that the knowledge level consists of a continuous interpretation process -which does not produce representations-or is absent altogether in both computer systems and humans using such systems. Brook's proposal was akin to strong currents of opinion in biological disciplines and psychology which emphasize the importance of the body and the interaction with the environment or the ecology. These views are also nonrepresentational and, in conjunction with embedded systems, gave rise to the so-called Embodied Cognition (i.e., [1] ). A form of this movement embraced the cybernetics tradition that cognition can be modeled from a control and dynamic systems perspective giving rise to the so-called Enactivism [8] . The E mbodied, E mbedded, E cological and E nactivist approach has gained considerable momentum in recent years and has been dubbed E4-Cognition.
This latter movement, specially in the form of enactivism, holds explicitly that the Turing Machine is limited for capturing mental phenomena. This resembles the connectionist claim of the early eighties but unlike the PDP program, E4-Cognition does not propose a computing engine based on an alternative to Turing's underlying intuitive notion. For this reason the E4 movement adds to other traditional disciplines that study cognition from a descriptive perspective outside of the computing paradigm, such as the neurosciences, psychology, linguistics, philosophy of mind, anthropology, biology, and possible others. These disciplines can produce great insights into the workings of the mind and have potentially high-impact applications. However, they shift the question that initiated the computing view of cognition when the Turing Machine was made available, that focused on modeling the information processing engine that was causal and essential to mental phenomena. Without a computing engine the latter question is beyond the scope of E4-Cognition and other descriptive disciplines.
In the same way as Connectionism, E4-Cognition pointed out the limitations of AI to scale up for modeling perception, thought, language and memory. And indeed, the observation is fair giving the current state and prospects of current computational models of mental processes. Despite the great success of AI in some aspects, such as classification, prediction and diagnosis, which has been achieved in some domains with deep-learning neural networks and machine learning in general, the mental competence of today's most sophisticated programs and robots is very limited -i.e., when it is compared with humans and other animals with a developed enough nervous system. In particular, the study of diverse aspects of consciousness can be addressed in such disciplines but AI systems cannot be aware or conscious. However, the challenge is not to AI but most fundamentally to the computing paradigm and hence to Cognition based This dilemma is illustrated in Figure 4 
Table Computing
A third intuitive notion of computing underlying a possible computing machine consists of representing functions as graphs in a cartesian coordinate system or in common tables, and finding the values of arguments by direct inspection. This form is called here Table Computing . In this representation, columns correspond to arguments and rows to values, and a function is defined if every column has a mark in at most one row (i.e., in the intersecting cell). All finite discrete functions can be defined in this format [20] .
Table computing is opposed to Turing Machine in three salient features: 1) while the representation of a function in the TM is intensional -i.e., given by a description-in table computing functions are defined extensionally; 2) while every TM defines a particular algorithm and computes a particular function, in table computing all functions are computed through the same basic algorithm -i.e., select the column corresponding to the argument, find the marked cell and select the row corresponding to the value; if there is no marked cell in the column, the function is partial and has no value for such argument; and 3) while TMs computations are serial and local to the cell inspected by the scanner at each computation step, in table computing cells can be defined as active processing units, allowing that operations between cells, columns and rows are performed in a fully parallel fashion. Table computing has the limitation that most functions are known through descriptions, have very large and often infinite domains, whose representations in tables are impractical, and rendering the extension requires the use of TMs with appropriate algorithms. However, this is not necessarily the case for interactive systems and natural computing, which compute functions with finite and often small domains, as illustrated by the common use of tables and diagrams by people.
Relational-Indeterminate Computing
Turing's intuition -that the mathematical function is the basic object of computing-is also contingent as the mathematical relation can be chosen instead. A consequence of Turing's choice is that all computations are fully determinate because the relation between the arguments and values is fixed and the function precedes the algorithms that computes it. From this perspective what an algorithm does is to render explicitly the knowledge that is implicit in the definition or description of the function that it computes. Thus, if an algorithm terminates it always produce the same value for the given argument. Indeed, Turing stated that the deterministic character of TMs is much closer in its practical implementation than the determinism considered by Laplace (Turing, 1950, s.5) .
Choosing the relation as the basic object of computing is more general and augments the expressive power of representations. However, computations are no longer fully determinate because there may be arguments that have more than one value. Evaluating a relation in this setting can be construed as choosing one among all possible values randomly. Thus, such computing engine is stochastic, computations become indeterminate and the machine has an intrinsic entropy. This form of computing is called here Relational-Indeterminate.
The entropy of a relational-indeterminate computation can be construed as the average indeterminacy of all the arguments of the relation that is the object of computing. A function has one value for all of its arguments and its entropy is zero. Partial functions do not define a value for all the arguments, but if the function is known it is also known that such arguments have no values, and the entropy of partial functions is also zero. Relational-indeterminate computing shows that the TM machine is the computing engine with entropy zero, but there are computing engines with entropies larger than zero [20] .
Relational-indeterminate computing can be used in conjunction with table computing. This format has the advantage that if every function represents a concept or unit of content, the superposition of several functions representing concepts gives rise to a distributed representation but without network or connectionist connotations: marked cells of a table can belong to more than one function (i.e., the intersection points) and contribute to the representation that are serial and local to the cell of the tape inspected by the scanner at each computation step. 
The Mode of Computing
There is an open-ended set of intuitive notions of computing underlying different machines or formalisms, as exemplified by the previous discussion. This diversity can be seen in terms of the proposed hierarchy of system levels in which each machine or formalisms has a distinctive system level that here is called The Mode of Computing. This level stands directly below the knowledge level and above other system levels down to the physical one, as illustrated in Figure 5 .
The mode of computing is the strategy, device, artifact or natural phenomenon that is used to carry on with the computation. In the case of the Turing Machine and its equivalent formalisms -the λ-calculus, Recursive Functions Theory, Abacus computations or the Von Neumann Architecture, ANNs, etc.-the mode of computing is Algorithmic Computing. This mode uses welldefined procedures or algorithms that map arguments into values of the function being computed by symbolic manipulation. Formal languages and Automata theory, the theory of the complexity of algorithms, the theory of computability and non-computable functions, such as the halting problem, were developed in relation to algorithmic computing but other modes may have different salient features.
There are modes that use symbolic manipulation but differ from algorithmic computing in principled aspects. For instance, table computing, which uses only one algorithm -and therefore, it can be dispensed with the properties of algorithms in general-or relational-indeterminate computing in the table format which uses a small set of procedures that work in parallel and terminate always but whose computations are defined and performed as standard symbol manipulation operations [20] .
There are also modes of computing that do not use symbolic manipulation and perform computations by other means such as analogical and quantum computing, and even sensors and transducers of diverse sorts. These modes do not rely on algorithms: electrical analogical computers transform inputs into outputs almost instantly and there is no sense in which these machines compute following a well-defined discrete procedure. Quantum computers can also be thought of as analogical and the use of the term "quantum algorithm" is informal for the same reason.
The level of the mode of computing can be partitioned on two or more sub-levels; for instance, ANNs thought of as virtual machines are above the Turing Machine that performs the actual computations, but they are as well immediately below a symbolic level in which communication and thought take place. For analogical modes -such as quantum computing-there may be a symbolic interface through which inputs and outputs to the natural phenomena that performs the computing process -the actual quantum engine-are presented to the knowledge level; similarly, standard analogical computers may have a table computing interface through which the inputs and outputs are presented to the human interpreter.
The inputs and outputs of all modes of computing are interpreted in relation to a predefined set of conventions and the product of such interpretations -i.e., the representation of such interpretations-is human knowledge held at the knowledge level.
Implications for Church Thesis
Church Thesis states that the Turing Machine computes the set of all computable functions, that this set corresponds to the functions that can be computed intuitively by people, and that all general enough formalisms are equivalent to TMs [3] . The strongest version of this thesis states that the TM is the most powerful computing machine that there can be in any possible sense. This thesis can be understood in terms of what is being computed but also in terms of how the computation is carried out. In the former sense and adopting Turing's basic intuition -the mathematical function is the basic object of computing-the thesis is most probably right as the TM does compute the full set of computable functions, and it is very unlikely that a machine capable of computing the halting problem, for instance, is ever defined. For this, if "powerful" means capable of computing all computable functions, the TM is indeed the most powerful machine.
However, Church Thesis is problematic if "powerful" is understood in terms of the properties of practical machines or how computations are performed. All formalisms differ precisely in that they are more powerful than others in some respects but weaker in others, and computing machines are characterized by the particular trade-offs that they afford. In the case of algorithmic machines, for instance, the TM offers the clearest way to analyze the notion of computability but is very cumbersome to define algorithms in its format and computations are not efficient. The von Neumann architecture, on its part, if focused on the implementation of practical algorithms and has an explicit notion of memory (Random Access Memory) but it is not the best choice for studying the theoretical properties of algorithms. Thus, particular computing engines are more powerful than others in certain respects despite that "weaker" machines can also compute the full set of computable functions.
The thesis is also problematic if "powerful" is meant in relation to all possible intuitions underlying the phenomenon or phenomena of computing and their corresponding modes of computing. For instance, comparing algorithmic with table computing in terms of the properties of the algorithms is an empty exercise because this latter mode computes all the function with the same basic algorithm, and these two modes are employed in different contexts and are useful for different purposes. Also, comparing TMs with relational-indeterminate computing is not coherent as the former is fully determinate and entropy-free while the latter is indeterminate and entropic. There may be particular dimensions of different modes of computing that are comparable, such as the speed of a quantum versus a standard digital computer, but comparing different modes of computing as a whole is a category mistake. Hence, the strongest form of Church Thesis, which states that the TM is the most powerful machine in every possible sense, is incoherent.
Artificial versus Natural Computing
The most basic statements about computing are often about the trade-offs that characterize a mode of computing. Algorithmic computing has to afford the trade-off between expressive power and tractability embedded in Chomsky's Hierarchy [12] and the so-called Knowledge-Representation Trade-off [16, 15] . ANNs can express distributed representations but are very limited to express syntactic structure and have no memory. Relational-Indeterminate computing supports distributed representations too, and can express qualitative information with efficient computation, but is very limited for making complex calculations. Analogical computers are very efficient and computations are carried on almost instantly but compute specific sets of functions, are indeterminate and do not have memory capabilities. In general, every mode of computing affords some main trade-offs which define its explanatory power as a model of computing and its potential applications.
In addition of the trade-offs of particular modes, there are trade-offs between modes. The paradigmatic mode of artificial computing is algorithmic computing; this mode can make precise and complex calculations and is fully determinate, information preserving and hence entropy-free, but computations are local and this mode has a very limited theory of memory (i.e. RAM). The relational-indeterminate mode, on another hand, supports associative memories that can be computed efficiently through massive parallel computations, thus memory register, recall and retrieval operations are performed in a very few computational steps, but there may be information loss and computations are entropic [20] . These properties resemble perhaps better the properties of natural computing. The trade-off between the algorithmic and the relational-indeterminate modes suggests a distinction between artificial or engineering computing versus natural computing in four salient dimensions -algorithmic capacity, memory structure, whether the mode supports associative memory and the amount of entropy involved in computations-as illustrated in Figure 6 . This opposition is not meant to be categorical and it is presented merely as a rough hypothesis of some main dimensions that may differentiate these two forms of computing.
The Mode of Computing, Cognition and Consciousness
The mode of computing and the hierarchy of system levels provide a novel perspective on the representational and non-representational views of cognition. In the former, the knowledge level holds representations of interpretations of the objects or processes at the level of the mode of computing but in the latter such mental objects do not exist.
The ontological status of mental objects is problematic, but if these objects are postulated at all, a parsimonious criterium about their nature could be that they reflect the properties or process of their corresponding objects at the level of the mode of computing, for all modes that are used in natural computing. The algorithmic mode uses symbolic manipulation (i.e., the basic operations of the Turing Machine) whose interpretations at the knowledge level can be thought of as propositions expressed in the Mentalese. Other symbolic modes, such as table computing and the relational-indeterminate, are characterized by the use of the space as the medium and, in the latter case, by the indetermination of its structures, thus their interpretations at the knowledge level can be thought of as images in opposition to propositions with a linguistic character.
In the representational view it needs to be held that mental objects at the knowledge level require no further interpretation; otherwise, interpretation would involve an infinite regress. It has to be held as well that human interpreters are conscious by the mere fact of having such representations in mind, at least when such expressions are the focus of attention, including the qualitative, experiential or phenomenological aspect of consciousness [5] .
A further consideration is that mental phenomena is caused by the activity of the brain, and needs to depend on the physical substratum or medium where the computing process is carried out -which is causal and essential to the mental object. Such medium and operations constitute the mode of natural computing. Thus, in the representational view, cognition and consciousness would depend on the mode of computing. Hence, a fundamental question for this view is what is the mode of natural computing, that is the cause of consciousness. Finding such mode and the property that makes interpreters ascribe meanings to symbols or processes and have subjective experience would equate to solving the strong problem of consciousness [5] . However, this is an open question for science altogether and there is not or does not seem to be any plausible answer in sight.
Non-representational views hold, on the other hand, that there are no representations at the knowledge level or, more baldly, that there is no such a thing as "the knowledge level". This can be elicited as claiming either that the so-called knowledge level consists of a continuous interpretation process of the objects at the level of the mode of computing or, more radically, that the knowledge level is absent altogether in both artificial and natural computing.
The interpretative view allows for holding that in natural computing the knowledge level and the level of the mode of computing fuse in a single level that is casual to consciousness. If the mode of computing uses a representational structure, such structure is the actual representation and the operations on it are actual interpretations that allow the agent to be aware, understand and experience the world. The quality of the experience would correspond to the mode of natural computing employed in particular computations, including propositions and images. Likewise, if the mode is non-representational, the computing process is the actual interpretation directly. This view is perhaps more parsimonious because mental objects are dispensed with altogether and allows for representational and non-representational views to co-exist coherently, depending of the properties of the modes of computing involved.
There remains the view that the knowledge level is absent altogether in both artificial and natural computing. In this view meanings are not ascribed to objects or processes at the level of the mode of computing. From such perspective computing becomes an objective property of machinery, but it could be ascribed as well to organs, such as the heart or the stomach, communication and control devices (e.g., telephones, radios, thermostats, etc.) or even to transducers and sensing devices of all sorts. Arbitrary physical, chemical or biological phenomena could also be considered computing machines, including the universe as a whole. In this view there are not interpretations nor meanings, hence there is not consciousness nor experience. In this latest view computing is detached from interpretation and becomes a rather empty notion.
In summary, if there is a knowledge level, either understood as constituted by mental objects or thought of it as the interpretation of the objects or processes at the level of the mode of computing, there are interpretations, and hence computing. The mode of computing is causal to the ascription of meaning and conscious experience. Each mode of natural computing would yield a particular quality or kind of experience. Experience or awareness would be how computing with a particular mode feels, for all modes used in natural computing. The notion of the mode of computing involves that computing and interpreting are two aspects of the same phenomenon or, more bluntly, that there is not computation without interpretation and vice versa. Consciousness and experience are the manifestations of computing/interpreting. Interpreting is what distinguishes computing machinery from standard machinery. In the case of artificial computing the process is split in two entities: the one that supports a mode of computing and the one who makes the interpretation. In the case of natural computing the mode of computing and the knowledge level fuse in a single level that is held by the interpreter.
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